

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 STATE 083821 TOSEC 030155
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 083821 TOSEC 030155

EYES ONLY TONY LAKE, DIRECTOR S/P

E.O. 11652:XGDS-1

TAGS:SOPN, XX

SUBJECT:DRAFT TEXT

1. FOLLOWING IS THE LATEST DRAFT OF THE SECRETARY'S APRIL

10 SPEECH ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL. TEXT

FOLLOWS.

2. BEGIN TEXT. THE DEEPEST HOPE OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IS

TO LIVE IN A WORLD AT PEACE. TODAY, I WANT TO TELL YOU

ABOUT WHAT WE ARE DOING, THROUGH A STRONG DEFENSE AND

THROUGH DELIBERATE NEGOTIATION ON ARMS CONTROL, TO STRENG-
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 083821 TOSEC 030155

THEN THAT PEACE.

3. OUR SECURITY, AND THAT OF OUR ALLIES CONTINUES TO REST ON

THE FOUNDATION OF OUR MILITARY STRENGTH. THIS COUNTRY HAS

NOW, AND WILL ALWAYS BE PREPARED TO MAINTAIN, AN EFFECTIVE
MILITARY DEFENSE, SOPHISTICATED ENOUGH TO DEAL WITH ALL AS-
PECTS OF THE MILITARY COMPETITION.

4. WE WILL MAINTAIN THIS STRENGTH FOR TWO REASONS.

5. FIRST, WE UNDERSTAND AS A NATION THAT OUR SECURITY DE-
PENDS UPON THE CREDIBILITY OF OUR DETERRENT -- BEING STRONG
ENOUGH SO THAT NO ADVERSARY WILL EVER BE IN A POSITION TO
BELIEVE THAT IT COULD ATTACK US OR OUR ALLIES WITHOUT DIS-
ASTEROUS CONSEQUENCES FOR ITSELF.

6. SECOND, FROM THAT STRENGTH, WE CAN SEEK TO REDUCE THE
RISKS OF MILITARY COMPETITION THROUGH NEGOTIATED AGREE-
MENTS; OUR CONTINUED STRENGTH IS A PREREQUISITE FOR EFFEC-
TIVE ARMS CONTROL.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 083821 TOSEC 030155

7. IN THE WORLD TODAY, A STRONG DEFENSE AND ARMS CONTROL
ARE NOT SEPARATE PATHS TO NATIONAL SECURITY; THEY ARE STEPS
ALONG THE SAME PATH.

8. WE CAN LIMIT THE RISKS OF WAR THROUGH SENSIBLE ARMS
CONTROL. BUT FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE, ARMS CONTROL WILL
NOT ELIMINATE THOSE RISKS. MILITARY COMPETITION WILL CON-
TINUE.

9. BUT NEITHER CAN WE ASSURE OUR SECURITY BY MILITARY
STRENGTH ALONE. ANY ATTEMPT, BY EITHER SIDE, TO ACHIEVE
MILITARY ADVANTAGE WILL ENCOURAGE THE OTHER SIDE TO DO THE
SAME, WITH THE NET EFFECT OF A CONTINUING MOVEMENT TOWARD

LARGER, MORE COMPLEX AND LESS STABLE WEAPON SYSTEMS ON BOTH SIDES, A STEADY DECREASE IN OUR SECURITY, AND A MOUNTING STRAIN UPON OUR SOCIETY.

10. WITH THIS OVERRIDING PRINCIPLE IN MIND, I WANT TO REVIEW THE VARIOUS ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS IN WHICH WE ARE ENGAGED.

11. THERE IS A STRONG ELEMENT OF CONTINUITY IN THE EFFORT

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 STATE 083821 TOSEC 030155

TO IMPROVE OUR SECURITY THROUGH SOUND AND EFFECTIVE ARMS CONTROL. FROM THE BARUCH PLAN OF 1946, THROUGH THE OPEN AIR TEST BAN TREATY, SALT I AND THE NEGOTIATIONS TOWARD SALT II, EACH ADMINISTRATION HAS ADVANCED THE EFFORT TO STABILIZE THE ARMS RACE THROUGH NEGOTIATED MUTUAL RESTRAINT. WE ARE ENGAGED AT THE PRESENT MOMENT IN A WIDER RANGE OF ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS THAN EVER BEFORE IN OUR HISTORY, BECAUSE BOTH THE OPPORTUNITIES AND THE CHALLENGES WE FACE ARE GREATER THAN EVER BEFORE.

-- SALT:

12. LET ME TURN FIRST TO THE STRATEGIC ARMS TALKS WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

13. IT IS AGAINST THE YARDSTICK OF OUR SECURITY THAT ANY SALT AGREEMENT MUST BE MEASURED.

14. IT MUST IMPROVE OUR OVERALL SECURITY POSITION AS COMPARED WITH THE LIKELY SITUATION WITHOUT AN AGREEMENT.

15. IT MUST TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF OUR
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 STATE 083821 TOSEC 030155

ALLIES AS WELL AS OURSELVES.

16. AND WE MUST HAVE FULL CONFIDENCE IN OUR INDEPENDENT ABILITY TO VERIFY SOVIET COMPLIANCE AND TO DETECT ANY EFFORT, CONTRARY TO THE AGREEMENT, THAT COULD LEAVE US AT A STRATEGIC DISADVANTAGE.

17. WE WILL NOT ACCEPT ANY AGREEMENT THAT DOES NOT MEET EACH OF THESE ESSENTIAL STANDARDS.

18. WE HAVE MADE SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS OVER THE PAST YEAR TOWARD SUCH AN AGREEMENT. THERE REMAIN IMPORTANT AREAS OF DIFFERENCE. I WILL BE MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO IN THE NEXT TWO WEEKS TO ATTEMPT TO NARROW THOSE REMAINING DISAGREEMENTS. WE ARE HOPEFUL THAT WE WILL REACH AN AGREEMENT OVER THE NEXT SEVERAL MONTHS. BUT WE WILL CONTINUE TO NEGOTIATE FOR AS LONG AS IT TAKES TO ACHIEVE AN AGREEMENT THAT ADVANCES OUR SECURITY INTERESTS.

19. LET ME EXPLAIN WHAT THE AGREEMENT THAT IS EMERGING WOULD ACCOMPLISH AND HOW IT WOULD STRENGTHEN OUR SECURITY.

20. FIRST, IT WOULD ESTABLISH EQUAL LIMITS FOR BOTH SIDES
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 06 STATE 083821 TOSEC 030155

ON THE OVERALL NUMBER OF STRATEGIC MISSILES AND BOMBERS, AND SUSTAIN THIS EQUALITY THROUGH 1985. AS YOU KNOW, THE FIRST SALT AGREEMENT ALLOWED THE SOVIETS GREATER NUMBERS

THAN THE UNITED STATES BECAUSE OF OUR OFFSETTING TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITIES. FOLLOWING THAT AGREEMENT, CONGRESS CALLED FOR ANY NEW AGREEMENT TO BE BASED ON EQUAL NUMBERS. THE AGREEMENT THAT IS NOW EMERGING FIRMLY ESTABLISHES THAT PRINCIPLE.

21. SECOND, THE TREATY WOULD REDUCE THE LEVEL OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS BELOW WHAT THE SOVIETS HAVE ALREADY CONSTRUCTED. IT WOULD REQUIRE THE SOVIETS TO DESTROY 300 SYSTEMS CURRENTLY TARGETED AGAINST THE UNITED STATES. WE, ON THE OTHER HAND, WOULD NOT BE REQUIRED TO DESTROY ANY SYSTEMS CURRENTLY DEPLOYED.

22. THIRD, WE ARE ALSO SEEKING SUBLIMITS ON THOSE SOVIET SYSTEMS WE SEE AS MOST THREATENING AND DESTABILIZING, SUCH

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 07 STATE 083821 TOSEC 030155

AS SOVIET ICMB'S EQUIPPED WITH MIRV'D WARHEADS.

23. FOURTH, WE ARE TRYING TO IMPOSE SOME CONTROLS ON THE IMPROVEMENT OF EXISTING WEAPONS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW AND MORE SOPHISTICATED SYSTEMS. IN PARTICULAR, WE ARE SEEKING TO DELAY THE DEPLOYMENT OF A NEW GENERATION OF SOVIET ICBM'S, WEAPON SYSTEMS WHICH WILL BE EVEN MORE DEADLY AND THREATENING THAN THOSE CURRENTLY DEPLOYED.

24. FIFTH, THE AGREEMENT WE ARE NEGOTIATING WOULD PERMIT THE UNITED STATES TO PRESERVE ITS PROJECTED STRATEGIC FORCES AND PURSUE ESSENTIAL OPTIONS FOR MODERNIZING OUR FORCES. SPECIFICALLY, IT WOULD ALLOW US TO CONTINUE OUR

MAJOR DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS, SUCH AS THE CRUISE AND MX
MISSILES.

25. SIXTH, IT WOULD SPECIFICALLY PROTECT THE INTERESTS OF
OUR ALLIES. MINDFUL OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STRATEGIC
ARMS NEGOTIATIONS AND OUR SECURITY COMMITMENTS IN NATO, WE
HAVE CONSULTED CLOSELY WITH OUR ALLIES AT EACH STEP OF THE
NEGOTIATIONS, AND WE WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 08 STATE 083821 TOSEC 030155

26. FINALLY, WE WILL INSIST THAT AN AGREEMENT BE INDEPEN-
DENTLY VERIFIABLE. OUR ABILITY TO VERIFY MUST HAVE
SUFFICIENT RELIABILITY TO DETER AND TO DEAL WITH POSSIBLE
VIOLATIONS BEFORE THEY HAVE A SIGNIFICANT EFFECT ON THE
STRATEGIC BALANCE. WE MUST BE ABLE TO ASSURE OURSELVES
THAT THE SOVIETS ARE LIVING UP TO THEIR COMMITMENTS.

27. AS WE PURSUE THESE NEGOTIATIONS, AND JUDGE THE MERITS
OF ANY AGREEMENT, WE SHOULD HAVE A REALISTIC PERSPECTIVE ON
WHAT WE CAN -- AND CANNOT -- ACHIEVE THROUGH A SOUND SALT
II AGREEMENT.

28. NO SINGLE SALT AGREEMENT WILL ELIMINATE ALL, OR EVEN
MOST, OF THE THREATS AGAINST OUR FORCES. BUT BY CONTROL-
LING THE SIZE, NATURE AND DIRECTION OF ARMS PROGRAMS ON
BOTH SIDES, WE CAN MAKE THAT COMPETITION SAFER BY REDUCING
THE UNCERTAINTIES THAT FUEL THE ARMS RACE, MAKE DEFENSE
PLANNING MORE DIFFICULT, AND INCREASE THE CHANCE OF A
DANGEROUS MISCALCULATION.
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 09 STATE 083821 TOSEC 030155

29. STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL WILL NOT, BY ITSELF, GUARANTEE
STABILITY IN THE U.S. - SOVIET RELATIONSHIP. WE CONTINUE
TO HAVE DIFFERENT VIEWS OF THE WORLD AND CONFLICTING LONG-
TERM AIMS. BUT SUCH STABILITY MAY BE BEYOND OUR GRASP
WITHOUT SALT. WE NEED NOT BE SANGUINE ABOUT SOVIET POWER
OR INTENTIONS TO RECOGNIZE THAT AS INHABITANTS OF THE SAME
PLANET, WHO SHARE AWESOME POWER, WE HAVE A COMMON INTEREST
IN REDUCING THE MOST SERIOUS RISKS TO OUR SURVIVAL.

30. WE AND THE SOVIETS BOTH KNOW THE KIND OF TERRIBLE
DESTRUCTION THAT WOULD RESULT FROM A NUCLEAR WAR.

31. WE BOTH KNOW THAT WE WILL ULTIMATELY MATCH WHAT THE
OTHER SIDE DOES IF THE RACE CONTINUES;

32. AND WE BOTH KNOW THAT THE ONLY WAY DOWN THE NUCLEAR
LADDER IS BY BALANCED AND MUTUAL ACTIONS.

33. THEREFORE, DESPITE THE FACT THAT WE ARE BOTH INTENTLY
PURSUING OUR OWN SELF-INTEREST -- DESPITE THE FUNDAMENTAL
DIFFERENCES THAT EXIST BETWEEN US -- WE ARE ABLE TO FIND

SOME COMMON GROUND ON WHICH TO AGREE TO LIMIT OUR MOST
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 10 STATE 083821 TOSEC 030155

DESTRUCTIVE WEAPONS.

34. THE ESSENCE OF THIS NEGOTIATION IS MUTUALITY OF BENE-
FIT. THERE WILL BE NO AGREEMENT WHICH SOLELY BENEFITS THE

US AND IMPOSES LIMITATIONS ONLY ON THE SOVIETS. OUR MOST INTENSE EFFORT HAS GONE INTO ENSURING THAT THE EXCHANGE OF MUTUALLY PERCEIVED BENEFITS AND COSTS IS INDEED AS EQUAL AND PRECISE AS CAN POSSIBLY BE OBTAINED. I BELIEVE WE ARE ACHIEVING THIS. WE WILL CERTAINLY AGREE TO NOTHING LESS.

35. WITH OR WITHOUT A NEW SALT AGREEMENT, WE WILL DO WHATEVER IS NECESSARY TO KEEP PACE WITH WHATEVER LEVEL OF MILITARY COMPETITION IS REQUIRED. BUT A SOUND AND EFFECTIVE SALT AGREEMENT CAN ASSIST US IN MAINTAINING THAT STRATEGIC BALANCE AT REDUCED LEVELS OF RISK.

--ASAT:

36. ALONG WITH SALT, THERE ARE NUMEROUS OTHER ASPECTS TO THE MILITARY COMPETITION WHICH MUST BE ADDRESSED. AN EX-CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 11 STATE 083821 TOSEC 030155

PANSION OF THE ARMS RACE TO SPACE WOULD BE A CHILLING PROSPECT. EVIDENCE THAT THE SOVIET UNION SEEMS TO BE DEVELOPING AN ANTI-SATELLITE CAPABILITY IS DEEPLY DISTURBING. WE ARE PREPARED TO PROTECT OURSELVES AGAINST SUCH A THREAT AND TO MATCH THE SOVIETS IF NECESSARY. BUT A FAR PREFERABLE COURSE WOULD BE TO PREVENT AN ANTI-SATELLITE WARFARE RACE FROM OCCURRING. FOR THIS REASON, WE HAVE PROPOSED TALKS WITH THE SOVIETS AIMED TOWARD KEEPING SPACE OPEN FOR FREE AND PEACEFUL USE BY ALL COUNTRIES THROUGH A NEGOTIATED AGREEMENT. THE SOVIET UNION HAS NOW ACCEPTED OUR PROPOSAL, AND TALKS WILL BEGIN EARLY NEXT MONTH.

--ARMS CONTROL IN EUROPE:

37. AS WE CONSULT WITH OUR ALLIES OVER THE SHAPE AND DIRECTION OF A SALT AGREEMENT, WE ARE ALSO WORKING WITH THEM IN THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS IN VIENNA TO ACHIEVE A MORE STABLE EAST-WEST BALANCE IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

38. THE AGREEMENT WE ARE STRIVING TO REACH WOULD:

--PUT A CAP ON THE BUILDUP OF SOVIET AND WARSAW PACT FORCES

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 12 STATE 083821 TOSEC 030155

IN CENTRAL EUROPE;

--IT WOULD OBTAIN AT LEAST SOME IMPROVEMENT FROM NATO'S POINT OF VIEW IN THE RELATIONSHIP OF CONVENTIONAL GROUND FORCES;

--AND IT WOULD INCREASE THE WARNING TIME FOR ANY ATTACK.

39. AN AGREEMENT IN THIS AREA WOULD STRENGTHEN THE MILITARY BALANCE IN EUROPE AND EASE POLITICAL TENSIONS.

40. WE WILL SHORTLY BE MAKING A NEW EFFORT TO GET THE TALKS MOVING. (QUERY: SHOULD WE GO BEYOND THIS ON THE NEW INITIATIVE?)

41. AT THE SAME TIME, WE ARE ENSURING THAT NATO FORCES ARE FULLY CAPABLE OF DEALING WITH THE APPRECIABLE GROWTH OF SOVIET AND WARSAW PACT CAPABILITIES.

--- THE US HAS SHARPLY INCREASED THE EMPHASIS ON NATO DEFENSE IN OUR CURRENT BUDGET.

--- ALONG WITH OUR ALLIES, WE ARE INTRODUCING NEW TACTICAL AIRCRAFT, NEW GENERATIONS OF ARMORED VEHICLES, AND
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 13 STATE 083821 TOSEC 030155

NEW PRECISION-GUIDED MUNITIONS.

--LEADERS OF THE NATO NATIONS WILL BE MEETING IN WASHINGTON

IN MAY, AND ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL TOPICS ON THEIR AGENDA

WILL BE A LONG-TERM PROGRAM TO IMPROVE ALLIANCE DEFENSE.

(QUERY: WE WILL NEED TO ADD LANGUAGE HERE ON ERW.)

--THE GLOBAL DIMENSION:

42. BEYOND THE OBVIOUS THREAT TO AMERICAN SECURITY FROM AN

UNCONTROLLED SOVIET AND WARSAW PACT BUILDUP, LIES THE EX-

PLODING GLOBAL ARMS RACE. SINCE WORLD WAR TWO, FORTY WARS

HAVE TAKEN PLACE -- NOT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE

SOVIET UNION, NOT IN EUROPE, BUT IN THE THIRD WORLD. THAT

IS THE AREA OF GREATEST INSTABILITY, WITH CONSTANT DANGERS

THAT REGIONAL TENSIONS CAN FLARE INTO REGIONAL WARS,

POSING GRAVE RISKS TO GLOBAL PEACE. THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR

WEAPONS AND EVER-MORE DESTRUCTIVE CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS TO

THAT PART OF THE WORLD DEMANDS OUR ATTENTION.

--FIRST, TO HALT FURTHER NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, WE HAVE BE-

GUN TO INVESTIGATE NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND EXAMINE NEW INSTI-

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 14 STATE 083821 TOSEC 030155

TUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS THAT WILL ENABLE THE NATIONS OF THE

WORLD TO HARNESS NUCLEAR ENERGY WITHOUT SPREADING THE MOST

DEADLY INSTRUMENTS OF WAR. (CTB COULD BE HERE IF WE DECIDE

TO INCLUDE.)

--SECOND, WE ARE GIVING NEW EMPHASIS TO CONTROLLING THE
INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN CONVENTIONAL ARMS. WE WILL CON-
TINUE TO UTILIZE ARMS TRANSFERS TO ADVANCE OUR OWN SECURITY
AND THAT OF OUR CLOSE FRIENDS. BUT IN THE FUTURE, THE BUR-
DEN OF PERSUASION MUST BE ON THOSE WHO FAVOR A PARTICULAR
ARMS SALE, RATHER THAN THOSE WHO OPPOSE IT. BECAUSE WE
RECOGNIZE THAT SLOWING DOWN CONVENTIONAL ARMS RACES CANNOT
BE ACHIEVED BY THE US ALONE, WE ARE DISCUSSING POSSIBLE
MEASURES FOR MULTILATERAL ACTION WITH OTHER ARMS SUPPLIERS,
AND ENCOURAGING THE PURCHASING NATIONS TO ADOPT REGIONAL
AGREEMENTS THAT LIMIT ARMS COMPETITION.

43. THIRD, WE ARE SEEKING TO PREVENT ARMS COMPETITION AND

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 15 STATE 083821 TOSEC 030155

MAJOR POWER RIVALRY FROM SPREADING TO AREAS LARGELY FREE
OF THEM IN THE PAST. WE HAVE LAUNCHED NEW NEGOTIATIONS
WITH THE SOVIET UNION TO AVERT AN ARMS RACE IN THE INDIAN
OCEAN. OUR OBJECTIVE IS TO STABILIZE THE MILITARY PRE-
SENCE OF BOTH SIDES AT THE LEVELS WHICH PREVAILED UNTIL
RECENT MONTHS AND THEN TO CONSIDER POSSIBLE REDUCTIONS.
THE BUILDUP IN SOVIET NAVAL FORCES IN THE AREA, HOWEVER,
IS DEEPLY DISTURBING AND WE WILL NOT ACCEPT AN INCREASED
SOVIET NAVAL PRESENCE AS PART OF SUCH AN AGREEMENT.

44. PROGRESS ON EACH OF THESE EFFORTS -- TO STOP THE

SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, TO REVERSE THE UPWARD TREND IN

CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRAFFIC, AND TO PREVENT NEW TENSIONS
FROM BUILDING IN AREAS NOW RELATIVELY FREE OF MILITARY
COMPETITION -- CAN ONLY BE ACHIEVED WITH A STRONG MEASURE
OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION. THE FIRST UN SPECIAL
SESSION ON DISARMAMENT, WHICH WILL MEET THIS MAY AND JUNE
IN NEW YORK, PROVIDES AN IMPORTANT OPPORTUNITY TO GAIN
SUPPORT HERE AND ABROAD FOR OUR ARMS CONTROL POLICIES

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 16 STATE 083821 TOSEC 030155

AND TO CONSIDER, TOGETHER WITH OTHER NATIONS, POSSIBLE
NEW INITIATIVES.

-- CONCLUSION:

45. I PUT THESE ISSUES BEFORE YOU TODAY BECAUSE THEY
NEED DISCUSSION AND DEBATE AND UNDERSTANDING AND
BECAUSE THE VOICE OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE NEEDS TO BE
HEARD ON THEM.

46. MILITARY COMPETITION TODAY IS CARRIED OUT IN HIGHLY
TECHNICAL TERMS, AND MILITARY JUDGMENTS MUST OFTEN BE
MADE BASED ON COMPLEX CALCULATIONS. BUT THE FUNDAMENTAL
ISSUES CAN, AND MUST, BE RESOLVED AS MATTERS OF COMMON
SENSE ABOUT HOW BEST TO PROTECT OUR SECURITY. WE
CANNOT LET TECHNICAL DEBATES CLOUD THE SIMPLE TRUTHS
WHICH LIE BEHIND THESE CALCULATIONS.

-- OUR OVERRIDING NATIONAL PURPOSE IS PEACE -- FOR
OURSELVES AND FOR OTHERS. WE WILL DO EVERYTHING IN OUR
POWER TO STRENGTHEN THAT PEACE.
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 17 STATE 083821 TOSEC 030155

-- WE DO THAT THROUGH A MILITARY DEFENSE THAT IS
SECOND TO NONE. WE HAVE HAD THAT STRENGTH IN THE PAST,
WE HAVE IT NOW, AND WE WILL MAINTAIN IT IN THE FUTURE.
BUT THAT ALONE IS NOT ENOUGH.

-- WE MUST ALSO, THROUGH CAREFUL AND WELL-CONCEIVED
NEGOTIATIONS, REVERSE THE DANGEROUS MILITARY COMPETITION
THAT INCREASES OUR STOCKPILES OF WEAPONS BUT DECREASES
OUR SAFETY AND SECURITY.

47. WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION ARE THE INVENTION
OF MANKIND. THEY CANNOT BE UN-INVENTED. BUT WE CAN
SUMMON THE SAME DETERMINATION, THE SAME CAREFUL PLANNING
AND SUSTAINED ENERGY, TO THE TASK OF BRINGING THOSE
WEAPONS UNDER SENSIBLE CONTROL AS WE DID FOR THE
EARLIER CHALLENGE OF SPLITTING THE ATOM.

48. THROUGH THAT EFFORT, WHICH WILL ONLY BE POSSIBLE
IF WE REMAIN STRONG AS A NATION, WE CAN MOVE TOWARD A
SAFER AND MORE SECURE WORLD. END TEXT.

COMMENT: FROM GELB, KREISBERG AND BERGER.
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 18 STATE 083821 TOSEC 030155

THE ABOVE - DRAFT IS ANOTHER WAY OF CUTTING THE SUBJECT
BUT ESSENTIALLY IN THE SAME PATTERN AS THE VERSION YOU
TOOK WITH YOU. WE REALIZE IT REQUIRES CONSIDERABLY

FURTHER WORK BUT WANTED YOU TO HAVE IT FOR REFERENCE. AN
ALTERNATE APPROACH, AND A SUBSTANTIALLY DIFFERENT SPEECH,
WOULD BE TO TAKE ON FRONTALLY THE INCREASINGLY SERIOUS
PROBLEM OF A WIDESPREAD EROSION OF SUPPORT IN THE
COUNTRY FOR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS WITH
THE SOVIETS. SUCH A SPEECH WOULD START OFF FROM THE
BEGINNING TO EXPLAIN AND JUSTIFY THE HISTORICAL BASIS FOR
ARMS NEGOTIATIONS, AND BUILD FROM THERE TO A SPECIFIC DIS-
CUSSION OF SALT, MBFR AND ERW (AS WE MUST), AND THE OTHER
DISARMAMENT ISSUES. THIS WOULD BE BOTH LONGER AND MORE
CONCEPTUAL. LES BELIEVES THIS IS THE SPEECH WHICH SHOULD
BE MADE. WE ALL FEEL STRONGLY THAT BEFORE TAKING THAT
SPEECH ON, WE NEED TO HAVE MORE SPECIFIC GUIDANCE FROM

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 19 STATE 083821 TOSEC 030155

THE SECRETARY. HAPPY BIRTHDAY. COOPER

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